ISD-Investigation | Pro-Russia influencers targeting audiences in West Africa
- Daniel Lutaaya
- Sep 4
- 24 min read
In September 2023, three countries with newly established military regimes (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) after claiming the group was “too closely aligned to Western powers”. Their new Alliance of Sahel States (AES) signalled a pivot towards the Kremlin: all three countries have turned to Russia for military support against armed groups following the withdrawal of French and UN troops.
This decision plays into the Kremlin’s geopolitical agenda in Africa where it has increasingly sought out local influencers, journalists and grassroot activists to expand influence by localising its narratives and positioning them as “a genuine opinion of someone who speaks the local language and knows the sensitivities of the people”.
This investigation provides an overview of the language and tactics employed by six pro-Kremlin influencers who target audiences in the AES.
Key findings
ISD studied more than 500 pieces of content posted by six pro-Kremlin influencers aimed at audiences in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES): Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The X posts collected were posted between 1 April and 31 May 2025, meanwhile the YouTube videos collected were posted over a longer timeframe (between 23 August 2016 and 31 May 2025).
The primary reason for this variation in data collection periods is the availability of data through commercial social listening tools. While it was possible to process large quantities of YouTube videos using AI tools, the X data was collected manually from Brandwatch, which only yields the last 90 days of results. However, all YouTube content considered relevant to the investigation was posted in the period 2020 to 2025, with the exception of one video from 2019. The narratives and the examples were drawn from videos posted between 2022 and 2025 to keep the analysis as relevant as possible.
Analysis of the content revealed the following findings:
Videos contained four main categories of narratives: content presenting Russia as more of an ally than the West; pro-Kremlin talking points about the Russia-Ukraine war; allegations that Ukraine supports terrorism in the Sahel zone; and accusations that Western countries support terrorists and terrorist groups in the Sahel zone. These narratives resemble those observed in other national contexts but adapted for local geopolitics.
Most of the content analysed was disseminated in video format, often presented through monologues that facilitate parasocial relationships with audiences. Four of the pro-Kremlin influencers studied in this investigation run their own YouTube channels, where they regularly publish videos on current affairs in the Sahel and other parts of Africa.
Some influencers have appeared on Russian state media, including RT or Sputnik. In other cases, they use snippets of videos whose visual layout is similar to RT, Sputnik or websites associated with the Kremlin-aligned Pravda network. ISD also discovered that local YouTube channels and TV stations based in the AES countries used video snippets that were previously broadcast on Russian state media and showed some of the pro-Kremlin influencers studied in this investigation.
Methodology
ISD collected 76 posts on X (formerly Twitter) and 429 YouTube videos from six pro-Kremlin influencers targeting the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) countries of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Three influencers were chosen based on an initial seed list of pro-Kremlin influencers from previous ISD projects. The other three pro-Kremlin influencers were found during an initial scoping exercise using social media monitoring tool Brandwatch.
The X content was posted between 1 April and 31 May 2025. The data collection period was shorter for posts on X as the posts were manually selected, which is a more time intensive process. They were considered relevant if either:
They contained the keywords ‘Russia’, ‘Ukraine’, ‘Putin’ and/or ‘Zelensky’,
They included a pro-Kremlin statement or,
Included known pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives.
The differing time periods for X and YouTube reflect the availability of data, with X data from Brandwatch covering only the past 90 days.
The YouTube videos selected for analysis were drawn from a larger set of content gathered from influencers’ YouTube channels containing the following keywords in the transcript:
‘Russia’, ‘Ukraine’, ‘Putin’, and/or ‘Zelensky’.
Due to the length of the videos, ISD used AI transcription tools to create automatic summaries on what the influencers said about these keywords. The AI processing of YouTube videos was followed by a manual review to code videos qualitatively according to the topics discussed. The posts on X were coded using the same method.
Background
Political context of the Sahel region and the formation of the AES
According to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), the Sahel region is now the “epicentre of global terrorism” and accounts for “over half of all terrorism-related deaths”. Most terrorist activity has been carried out by the Islamic State (IS) group affiliate in the Sahel and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), a branch of al-Qaeda (AQ). These militant groups compete for power, land and access to natural resources.
New recruits are easily found in areas neglected by authorities due to lack of state presence and high rates of poverty and unemployment. Despite being rich in natural resources, the region has suffered from economic stagnation, widespread poverty, and continuing insecurity and terrorism threats. Between 2020 and 2024, the Sahel region suffered several attempted and successful military coups.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger officially left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023. The move was prompted by ECOWAS demanding that the three countries restore democratic rule following military coups. In response, the AES accused ECOWAS of being too closely aligned to Western powers and expressed their desire to pivot towards Russia instead.
Mali
Mali experienced coups in 2020 and 2021. Both were led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, who first ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2020 and Colonel Bah Ndaw in May 2021. As a consequence of the coups and a pushback against democratic elections by the ruling military junta, France withdrew troops in 2022 after nine years of providing military aid against Islamic militants.
In response, the junta hired mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group, making Mali the base for its activity in West Africa. Human Rights Watch (HRW) accused Mali’s armed forces and the Wagner Group of committing serious human rights violations and atrocities against civilians since the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission. On 14 May 2025, the junta dissolved all political parties in Mali.
Burkina Faso
Burkina witnessed two military takeovers in 2022. In the first, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba replaced President Roch Marc Christian Kabora on 24 January 2022. Later, Damiba himself was deposed by Captain Ibrahim Traore. Elections due in July 2024 were deemed “not a priority” by the government and indefinitely postponed in September 2023. Traore has been accused of building a personality cult and clamping down on press, civil society and political opponents, and conscripting dissidents into the military.
After taking power, Traore ordered the removal of French troops and strengthened military cooperation with Mali and Russia. In 2023, Russia reopened its embassy in Ouagadougou, 31 years after its closure.
Niger
Until 2023, Niger had made relatively stable progress towards democracy and was considered “a model of democracy and development”. However, in July 2023, a military coup removed the democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazourn. The rebels claimed the existing government was corrupt and unable to stop increasing numbers of jihadist attacks.
After the coup, ECOWAS imposed sanctions including border closures, a no-fly zone for all commercial flights and the freezing of central bank assets. ECOWAS also threatened to send troops to Niger to restore democratic rules, solidifying the alliance between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Following the coup, Niger opened diplomatic relations with Russia, effectively ending its relationship with France as its primary political, business and cultural reference point.
In all three countries, military coups, political instability, economic challenges and security issues have left them vulnerable to influence operations aiming to shape their political and economic alignment, as well as regional policies in favour of Kremlin interests.
Pro-Kremlin Influencers in West Africa
The Kremlin’s desire to expand its influence in Africa in recent years, particularly in the Sahel and the Central African Republic (CAR), stands second only to China. Moscow’s irregular efforts to assert influence in the region include the deployment of mercenaries, the spread of disinformation, election interference, arms-for-resources deals and support for coups.
In June 2025, VIGINUM (the French government agency dedicated to detecting and countering foreign digital interference) identified Moscow-based news agency African Initiative as the main vehicle for Russia’s foreign manipulation and interference (FIMI) activities in Africa. African Initiative was created in September 2023 with the aim of becoming the main “information bridge between Russia and Africa”. This agency disseminates and promotes common anti-Western and pro-Kremlin propaganda in several languages across websites and social media accounts.
The agency also recruits influencers, journalists and ‘grassroots’ activists to relay and amplify pro-Kremlin narratives among local populations. These influencers localise narratives, making them sound like “a genuine opinion of someone who speaks the local language and knows the sensitivities of the people”. ‘Buzzer’ accounts increase the reach of these posts by sharing and reciprocal mentions; they may be either bots or humans.
For this investigation, ISD analysed content from two of the most prominent influencers in the region (Nathalie Yamb and Kemi Seba), as well as four smaller influencers. All of them promote pro-Kremlin viewpoints to audiences in the Sahel; they frequently share each other’s content and comment on each other’s posts to amplify their reach.
Example: Nathalie Yamb
At date of publication – Facebook: 782k followers, YouTube: 546k subscribers, X: 493k followers, TikTok: 248k followers, Instagram: 95.1k followers
Nathalie Yamb is a Swiss-Cameroonian pan-African influencer. Her self-designated moniker of “La Dame de Sochi” (“The Lady of Sochi”) derives from the October 2019 Sochi summit in Russia, where she accused France of plundering Africa’s resources, fomenting rebellions and training terrorists.
In November 2022, the US State Department identified ties between Yamb and entities linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the late leader of the Wagner Group. These include the US-sanctioned Association for Free Research and International Cooperation (AFRIC); the US-sanctioned Russian think-thank Foundation for National Values Protection (FZNC); and Media Afrique TV, a Cameroon-based French language media outlet with links to AFRIC.
Yamb lived in Côte d’Ivoire from 2007 to 2019, when she was expelled following her speech in Sochi. She was sanctioned by the EU in June 2025 for supporting the Kremlin’s information manipulation and interference campaigns.
According to Le Monde, Yamb is “one of the most outspoken and influential critics of French presence in Africa”. She has a total audience of more than 2 million accounts on mainstream social media platforms.
Example: Kemi Seba
At date of publication – Facebook: 1.3 million followers, TikTok: 484k followers, Instagram: 312k followers, YouTube: 248k subscribers
Born in France to parents from Benin, Kemi Seba has been described as a “radical black power activist”. He has been sentenced several times in France for incitement to racial hatred and has regularly been legally accused of antisemitism. He has an audience of more than 2 million across mainstream social media platforms.
Seba was stripped of his French nationality in July 2024 and received a diplomatic passport issued by Niger in August 2024. In a public statement on Facebook, Seba said that the passport had been issued “in view of the fight I have been waging for 25 years for Africa, at the risk of my life”. He aligns with the governments of Mali and Niger, and acts as a special advisor to the Nigerien government.
Seba was the former leader of Tribu Ka, a small group that shared antisemitic narratives and advocated for racial separation. The French government dissolved Tribu Ka in 2006. He currently leads the NGO Urgences Panafricanistes, which claims to partner with countries including Russia, Cuba, Venezuela and Iran.
Together with Yamb, the US State Department identified Seba as a “vital node of Prigozhin’s network” and a “prominent purveyor of Russia’s disinformation and propaganda”. Seba has advocated for African nations to build “a solid partnership with Russia”, which he claims will help steer them away from imperialist Western powers and reclaim their sovereignty and self-determination. He is regularly invited to Russia-Africa summits and has been accused by French authorities of receiving funding and support from Russia, particularly through the Wagner Group.
Other influencers
In addition to content shared by Nathalie Yamb and Kemi Seba, ISD analysed content shared by four other influencers. Two of them are based in Côte d’Ivoire, one in the United States, and one in France. These influencers are not named due to concerns for their privacy, as they have not courted as much public profile for (and are less well known due to) their pro-Kremlin views:
Female influencer based in the United States with 713k followers on Facebook, 101 subscribers on YouTube and 24.4k subscribers on Telegram at date of publication
Male influencer based in France with 470k followers on Facebook, 460k subscribers on YouTube, 232k followers on X, 17.2k followers on TikTok and 5.8k followers on Instagram at date of publication
Male influencer based in Côte d’Ivoire with 32.5k followers on Twitter at date of publication
Male influencer based in Côte d’Ivoire with 170k followers on Twitter at date of publication
In the YouTube sample, 25 percent of videos were collected from Nathalie Yamb and Kemi Seba’s YouTube channels and 65 percent of videos were collected from other influencers’ channels. The rest of the videos were media appearances or videos of the influencers uploaded by other channels. In the X sample, 15% of posts were by Nathalie Yamb and 85% of posts were by other influencers. Kemi Seba did not have an X presence at the time of writing.
Common Pro-Russia Narratives
Based on a narrative analysis on the posts collected, ISD identified found four main categories of pro-Kremlin narratives:
Narratives presenting Russia as a more reliable partner than the West for countries in the Sahel region
Broader pro-Kremlin narratives about the war in Ukraine
Allegations of Ukraine supporting terrorism in the Sahel region
Narratives that blame Western countries for terrorism.
As is common with pro-Kremlin propaganda, actors often sought to exploit and capitalise on existing grievances, using them to support pro-Kremlin narratives. The narratives put forward by these influencers are often contradictory. While most YouTube videos analysed blame France and other Western countries for meddling too much in the Sahel region, a minority conversely claimed that Western powers are not doing enough. Influencers often point to French financial resources allocated to Ukraine instead of helping the Sahel countries improve their security situation and economically supporting the island of Mayotte (a French overseas territory).
Figures 1 and 2 show the most prominent pro-Kremlin narratives shared by the influencers on YouTube and X. On both platforms, the most common narratives were that Russia is a reliable partner (YouTube: 44 percent; X: 41 percent) and pro-Kremlin viewpoints on the Russia-Ukraine war (YouTube: 28 percent; X: 34 percent).
However, narratives alleging Ukraine of supporting terrorism in the Sahel were significantly more common on YouTube than on X (15 percent compared to 3 percent); the reverse was true for narratives blaming Western countries for terrorism (1 percent versus 9 percent). A possible explanation for this is the difference in data collection periods: significant events linked to Western powers occurred in April and May 2025, which received Kremlin criticism. For example, the reception of the interim Syrian President Ahmet al-Sharaa by US President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron in May 2025 led to an increase in the number of posts spreading the narrative that Western countries support terrorism.
Other topics included the impact of French sanctions on Russia and the European economy; criticism of French media outlets in the Sahel; general anti-French narratives and attacks on France; and criticisms of Western and Ukrainian involvement in Africa.
Narratives presenting Russia as a better ally for countries in the Sahel region than the West
Over the past decade, France has become increasingly unpopular throughout the Sahel. In Mali, anti-France sentiment appears mainly related to the perceived failure of French military counterterrorism campaign Operation Barkhane (2013-2022). While the beginning of the campaign was largely regarded as a success, by the time French troops withdrew from Mali the country had suffered six consecutive years of rising rates of violence.
Counterinsurgency campaigns like Operation Barkhane are notoriously difficult; they require soldiers to engage in traditional combat while winning over civilian support. This feat is highly challenging as counterinsurgency operations are associated with high rates of violence against civilians, and there have been many accusations in Mali that civilians were killed by French airstrikes.
In Burkina Faso and Niger, there are similar grievances about France’s inability to curb threats from armed groups and the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel region since 2013. At the same time, France has been accused of “continued meddling” in the three countries’ internal affairs. All three countries have, therefore, experienced a strong growth in anti-French sentiment, which has led to an alignment towards new partners like Russia.
A Nigerien government official told Le Monde in December 2023: “Our alliances with the West have prevailed since colonisation and have not brought us good fortune. We need to get rid of them and move closer to other countries”.
Burkina Faso’s Foreign Minister stated during the November 2024 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi that “Russia is a partner with whom we can make progress”. During a side interview with Agence France-Presse (AFP) at the conference he further explained that “the offer which has been made through cooperation with Russia is better suited to the people”.
Pro-Kremlin actors have capitalised on this anti-French sentiment, as well as the instability following coups. The Microsoft Threat Analysis Centre called this strategy “Russia’s coup playbook in Africa”, a six-step process of:
Conducting long-term influence campaigns
Aligning with coup leaders
Seizing control of the narrative
Amplifying messaging through affiliates
Mobilising pro-Kremlin supporters
Banning dissenting media.
Local influencers are key in propagating narratives that present Russia as a more reliable partner for countries in the Sahel region. On X, ISD found posts actively promoting Russia, presenting Putin as a strong leader and emphasising Russia’s reliability. By contrast, European leaders are often described as weak.
In longer YouTube videos, Russia is labelled as an ally of African countries and a supporter of their anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle, especially against French influence. In these videos, influencers claim Western countries continue to have colonial interests; by contrast, Russia’s lack of participation in the colonial division of Africa allows it to have a mutually beneficial relationship with the AES. The long-term objective of these narratives appears to be to exacerbate distrust of French foreign policy efforts in the region.
The influencers present the reasons for collaboration with Russia by leaning on popular anti-colonialist tropes from the Soviet era that the Kremlin itself is reviving in official communication. Over the last few years, Putin himself has made references to the damage of colonial rule including “crushed African culture and the lives of people in the Sahel”. These narratives disregard Russia’s failed attempt to establish colonies in Africa in the 19th century, as well as Russian imperialism targeting immediate neighbours in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Journalist Issio Ehrich argues that partnerships with countries in the Sahel presents an opportunity for the Kremlin to secure geopolitical influence and access to revenue sources that are not subject to Western sanctions. Russia is the continent’s most important arms supplier, providing 40 percent of all weapon sales. Russia also has a strong presence in the African mining and energy markets. According to HRW, Kremlin-backed Wagner mercenaries and Mali’s armed forces have committed serious abuses against civilians following the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This abuse includes killing and forcibly disappearing civilians, as well as burning homes in military operations in towns and villages.
There is a clear discrepancy between these actions and public opinion in the region. The 2024 Mali Meter conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation found that 9 out of 10 respondents were satisfied with the cooperation between the Malian state and Russia. 97 percent stated that they had confidence in Russia helping the Malian state gain control over its territory. Conversely, when asked about who they trust to improve the security in the region, only 3 percent of Malians reported having confidence in the (now defunct) MINUSMA. By contrast, 93 percent have confidence in the Malian military, 62 percent in the Malian police and 14 percent have confidence in Russian mercenaries. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED data) suggests that the arrival of Wagner troops in Mali lead to a deterioration in the security situation and an increase in the level of violence, evidenced by the increased number of violent attacks by extremist groups. However, according to the 2024 Mali Meter results, interviewees had the impression that the security situation was improving overall. On the other hand, they felt let down by Western partners in areas like youth unemployment and poverty.
These figures suggest that cooperation with Russia is seen favourably by most Malians, whereas cooperation with France and other Western countries is viewed as a failed project.
The pro-Kremlin influencers assessed as part of this investigation, all of whom promote cooperation between the AES countries and Russia, have large followings and their content typically receives significant engagement. Together with the results from the Mali Meter, this suggests that pro-Kremlin messaging is popular with at least some segment of the Malian population. Ultimately, it is not possible to determine to what extent the pro-Kremlin viewpoints shared by these influencers represent existing public opinion in Mali.
Broader pro-Kremlin narratives about the war in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine was also a popular topic for the pro-Kremlin influencers in this investigation. Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, both Russia and Ukraine have expanded diplomatic efforts on the continent to garner support for their side of the war.
Ukraine produced its first Africa strategy in 2022 with the goal of countering Russia’s narrative while increasing trade and investment opportunities. Over the past three years, Ukraine has nearly doubled its number of African embassies and conducted a series of ministerial visits. According to Roman Sereda, Ukraine’s chargé d’affaires in Nouakchott, diplomatic efforts have largely focused on “maintaining [Ukraine’s] role as one of the guarantors of the world’s food security” and on “preventing Russia from using food supplies as political leverage”. Kyiv has presented itself as the target of an illegal invasion in its strategic communications in an attempt to gain support from African countries that have themselves suffered from colonisation.
The Kremlin, on the other hand, has invested significant resources into influence campaigns discrediting Ukraine.
Russia’s success in the fields of diplomacy and offline/traditional political influence is shown by a recent change in voting behaviour during UN General Assembly votes.
Between 2022 and 2025 there has been an increase in the number of African countries voting on the side of Russia or abstaining. At the same time, there has been a decrease in countries voting on the side of Ukraine.
During the initial UN General Assembly vote (in February 2022) on a resolution demanding the Kremlin to stop its aggression and withdraw from Ukrainian territory, 28 African countries voted in favour of the resolution, 25 countries abstained or did not participate, and only one country (Eritrea) voted with Russia. Niger voted in favour of the resolution to stop Kremlin aggression, Mali abstained and Burkina Faso was absent.
While many African countries have remained neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war, the AES states are among those to have adopted a more pro-Kremlin stance. In 2023, Mali voted against a UN resolution calling for an end to the Russia-Ukraine war and demanding Russia withdraw from Ukraine. In 2024, all three AES states–Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger–voted against the same UN resolution. Furthermore, in 2024, Mali and Niger accused Ukraine of “supporting international terrorism” and consequently ceased relations with Kiev.
Influencers closely follow Kremlin talking points on the conflict, seeking to undermine the position of Ukraine and Ukraine’s war efforts. In YouTube videos and posts on X, these accounts emphasise that Ukraine and the Ukrainian military are inferior to Russia.
Influencers also regularly attack Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on X and state that Ukraine is already defeated. On YouTube, ISD analysed videos of the influencers claiming that the war is a proxy war between Russia and NATO and the US. This argument commonly advanced by pro-Kremlin actors to defend Russian aggression, which ignores the fact that NATO is not a party in the war, although its member states provide military support provided to Ukraine.
Influencers also criticised France’s support for Ukraine on both X (two posts) and YouTube (10 videos). YouTube videos containing this criticism received between 80k and 110k views. Image 5 shows pro-Kremlin influencer Nathalie Yamb questioning which conflicts are France’s responsibility. The post received a total of 28.8k views and 756 likes.
Another pro-Kremlin influencer argued that France is destabilising Ukraine by supporting the Ukrainian military with weapons. Other videos stated that Paris is allocating funds to support the war in Ukraine instead of helping the AES states or supporting Mayotte (French overseas territory) with reconstruction efforts.
Half of the YouTube videos drew connections between the war in Ukraine and the political, security and economic situation in the Sahel region. These videos stated that both Russia and Africa have been subject to Western aggression and that European military involvement in Ukraine is developing into a global conflict. The most popular of these videos received more than 100k views. There were also two videos in the sample where influencers warned of ‘proxy warfare’, claiming that what happened in Ukraine might also happen in Africa if African countries continued to be under Western influence. The videos received 235k and 68k views, respectively.
Example: False claim by a Ukrainian soldier that Ukraine has already been defeated
Image 6 below is a still from a video posted by a pro-Kremlin influencer from Côte d’Ivoire. This image purports to show a “message from a Ukrainian soldier to his excellence the president of the world” (Vladimir Putin). Using AI-generated French, the soldier is seen apologising to Putin, saying that he does not have energy to fight anymore and will put down his weapons. The AI-generated voice states that the Ukrainian army has been let down by France and NATO, that Ukraine does not have a chance anymore, and it is time to end the war.
However, ISD can confirm that the video has been heavily manipulated. The original video is of a Ukrainian poet named Pavlo Vyshybaba reading a poem that he wrote for his daughter. This type of audio manipulation has become common in Russia-aligned influence campaigns over the last few years: ISD has tracked Operation Overload, a persistent, high-volume campaign aimed at shifting European public opinion on the war in Ukraine and undermining Ukraine’s war effort by impersonating media outlets, academics and law enforcement.
In line with ISD’s previous research that found that content with manipulated audio typically receives limited engagement, this video received only 4,682 views, 208 likes and 69 shares.
Allegations of Ukraine supporting terrorism in the Sahel region
Pro-Kremlin actors have repeatedly tried to associate Ukraine with terrorism in a variety of contexts to undermine Ukraine’s reputation and justify its invasion. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Kremlin frames Ukrainian military actions as “terrorist attacks” to justify “counterterrorism” operations.
As part of Ukraine’s efforts to increase its presence in Africa, Ukrainian special forces have been reported to be fighting alongside groups that oppose the Wagner mercenaries, including Tuareg separatists in Mali and the Sudanese army fighting against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Ukraine has received criticism following incidents including clashes on 27 July 2024: during the fighting, Tuareg separatist rebels and fighters linked to AQ killed dozens of Malian soldiers and Russian Wagner mercenaries. ECOWAS declared its “firm disapproval and firm condemnation of any outside interference in the region which could constitute a threat to peace and security in West Africa and any attempt aiming to draw the region into current geopolitical confrontations”. The Ukrainian military intelligence spokesperson Andriy Yusov later admitted that the Tuareg rebels and AQ fighters had been given the “necessary information” to conduct the attacks. The Ukrainian Embassy in Senegal posted a video of Ukrainian ambassador Yuri Pyvovarov alluding to supporting the rebels.
Following this incident and the reaction from Ukrainian officials, Mali and Niger cut diplomatic ties with Ukraine in August 2024. The Ukrainian Embassy in Senegal’s video was later removed, but pro-Kremlin influencers in the region were able to use this incident and the reaction of official Ukrainian entities as evidence to further promote the narrative that Ukraine openly supports terrorists across the Sahel region. In July 2025, an ARTE report also confirmed that Ukrainian soldiers were present in Northern Mali to train the Front de la Libération de l’Azawad (FLA), which is considered as a terrorist group by the Malian government.Facts and real incidents–such as the presence of Ukrainian special forces in Africa, and Ukrainian officials admitting providing support to Tuareg rebels and AQ fighters—are widely shared and discussed by the pro-Kremlin influencers. However, ISD observed that the influencers use these facts and real incidents to further promote anti-Ukraine sentiment, as well as to share well-known pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives that have already appeared in other contexts, as shown in the box below.
Image 7 shows a statement made by a pro-Kremlin influencer on X, claiming that Ukraine sponsors terrorism. The image shows a picture of Zelensky’s face transposed onto Abu Mohammed al-Joulani (now known as Ahmed al-Sharaa), the president of Syria formerly designated as a terrorist by several Western countries.
The influencer who shared this content labels Ukraine as a proxy of NATO and the EU. They also claim it is supporting AQ and the IS group in the Sahel. Box 1 shows an example of these two claims made by another pro-Kremlin influencer in a video on his YouTube channel. The influencer claims that Ukraine, on behalf of NATO, is supporting terrorist groups in the Sahel:
One video warned countries against military support for Ukraine and claimed that weapons provided to Ukraine ended up in the hands of terrorist groups in the Sahel. This narrative is a common pro-Kremlin claim also observed in other contexts such as the Israel-Hamas war. Videos containing this narrative typically received between 50k and 200k views, with the most popular video receiving 691k views.
Narratives blaming Western countries for terrorism
Across Africa, failed UN peacekeeping missions have stoked increasing resentment among local populations. MINUSMA (2013-2023), French Operation Barkhane (2014-2022) and the European Union’s Takuba Task Force (2020-2022) have all been widely criticised for failing to safeguard civilians and, in some cases, exacerbating local tensions. Journalists and commentators have often stated that decisions made by Western governments have contributed to violence and the rise of terrorist groups in the Sahel.
Journalist Issio Ehrich criticised the French government’s lack of accountability for military operations that killed civilians during Operation Barkhane and their unwillingness to enter negotiations or dialogues with terrorist groups. According to Ehrich, many men in the Sahel joined armed groups due to widespread poverty, with no alternatives to armed combat available. Although France doubled its spending for the region from €584 million to €1.17 billion, most of this was spent on military support. Funds for development cooperation decreased from €431 million in 2012 to €324 million in 2019. France also rejected alternative approaches to ending the violence and insecurity in the Sahel, such as former Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum’s approach of reintegrating former terrorists back into society.
Pro-Kremlin influencers capitalise on existing grievances to undermine the position of France, the EU and other Western powers, pushing the false narrative that Western states support terrorism in the Sahel. One influencer in the dataset drew parallels between the security situation in the Sahel and the war in Ukraine, saying that support for terrorist organisations is part of a larger plan of the political West to “destabilise” the continent:
Example: Criticism of Western countries building diplomatic ties with the Syrian government (e.g. ‘France is siding with jihadists in Syria’)
Influencers also criticised Western governments for having purportedly double standards in their decisions on collaborations with actors, fuelling the narrative that Western countries support terrorists.
Several posts on X reacted negatively to the May 2025 meeting of US President Trump and French President Macron with Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who is affiliated with the Syrian terrorist organisation Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)[1]. Image 8 shows a post on X by Nathalie Yamb, reading “Make terrorists great again”, which received 1.6k likes. The post featured a wanted poster from the US State Department offering a $10 million reward for information leading to the identification or location of al-Sharaa, which was removed in December 2024. The poster is juxtaposed with a photo of US President Donald Trump and President al-Sharaa meeting in Saudi Arabia on 14 May 2025 after a US-government announcement stating that Washington would lift all sanctions on the Syrian government and explore the possibility of normalising ties.
A week prior, President al-Sharaa also met with French President Macron at the Élysée Palace in Paris. This meeting was criticised in a post on X from a pro-Kremlin Ivorian influencer (see image 9); the post reads: “This crazy French politician #EmmanuelMacron after his meeting with the terrorist from Syria”. The writing on the image continues, “a jihadist received in France. France/Syria: a necessary dialogue?”
Tactics and dissemination of content
Most pro-Kremlin content in this investigation was produced and disseminated in video format. Four of the pro-Kremlin influencers run their own YouTube channels, where they regularly publish videos on current affairs in the Sahel and other parts of Africa. The content is disseminated in French, typically in the form of long monologues. One influencer publishes short videos on X, while another influencer only posts text-based content on X.
Three influencers have also appeared on Russian state media (including RT or Sputnik) or used snippets of videos whose visual layout is similar to RT, Sputnik or websites akin to the Kremlin-aligned Pravda network. ISD also found local YouTube channels and TV stations that repurposed the same snippets of Russian state media.
A US Justice Department Investigation in 2024 found that video was the preferred format of pro-Kremlin influencers hired by RT to disseminate pro-Kremlin propaganda ahead of the 2024 US presidential elections. In an article, NPR argued that “what sets the RT operation apart from many other interference efforts is that it appeared to reach a real audience, thanks to the recognizable names attached”.
The pro-Kremlin influencers in this investigation with YouTube channels have substantial audiences of around half a million subscribers each. The two influencers who do not have a YouTube channel have 169k and 31k followers on X, respectively.
All influencers present themselves as being from the Sahel region and as part of the community of the AES states. However, they appear to be outsiders to the communities that they claim to represent, as their personal ties to the region are not clear.
The influencers’ narratives have been observed in other contexts: narratives around the Russia-Ukraine war have previously been covered by ISD, including claims that weapons provided to Ukraine by NATO countries ended up in the hands of armed rebels in other countries. Pro-Kremlin influencers shared both the ‘original’ narrative as well as versions adapted to the context of the Sahel, exploiting regional grievances to promote Kremlin viewpoints.
Conclusion
This research demonstrates how pro-Kremlin influencers target audiences in the AES states through the exploitation of existing grievances and anti-France sentiment. Their goals are to promote Russia as a more reliable partner than the West, to undermine Ukraine’s war effort and build support for the Kremlin in the Russia-Ukraine war and to share narratives suggesting that both Ukraine and the West support terrorists in the Sahel.
ISD found that pro-Kremlin influence campaigns in this research ignore the documented adverse effects of Russian influence on both the economies and security situation of the host countries, such as the serious human rights abuses against civilians by Kremlin-backed Wagner mercenaries and Mali’s armed forces following the withdrawal of MINUSMA. This includes killing and forcibly disappearing civilians, as well as burning homes in military operations in towns and villages. ACLED data also suggested that the arrival of the Wagner troops in Mali lead to a deterioration in the security situation and an increase in the level of violence, evidenced by the increased number of violent attacks by extremist groups, contrary to the popular opinion that the Wagner troops helped to improve the security situation in Mali.
In order for AES governments and their populations to make informed decisions about foreign policy and alliances, it is important for public discourse (including content from social media influencers) to reflect both the positive and negative potential consequences of deepening partnerships with the Kremlin.
This Article was originally published by Institute for strategic Dialogue
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